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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DALE J. BAIRD, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
HANK GALETKA, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20020435-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. His 
petition challenged his convictions for sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony, 
dealing in harmful material to a minor, a third degree felony, and unlawful supply of 
alcohol to a minor, a class A misdemeanor. R. 1-2,23-25. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the post-conviction court correctly find that the petition was barred by the 
one-year statute of limitations governing petitions for post-conviction relief and that the 
interests of justice did not excuse petitioner's late filing? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews "an appeal from an order dismissing or 
denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower 
court's conclusions of law." Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7, U 4, 43 P.3d 467. 
2. Is the statute of limitations in the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-3 5a-107 (1996), an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus? 
Standard of Review: Defendant did not raise this issue below. '"[I]ssues not 
raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal... unless the petitioner 
demonstrates that 'plain error' occurred or 'exceptional circumstances' exist.'" State v. 
Calliham, 2002 UT 86, U 70,455 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (quoting Monson v. Carver, 928 
P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) (additional citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following provisions, whose 
text is reproduced in addendum A: 
U.S. CONST, art. I, § 9; 
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 5; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107 (1996). 
CASE AND FACT STATEMENT 
The Crimes 
On 20 October 1996 petitioner invited eleven-year-old D.D. to his hotel 
room/apartment. R. 131. Petitioner provided D.D. with alcohol and allowed him to look 
at pornographic magazines. R. 131, 140, 141-146. Petitioner inserted his penis into 
D.D/s rectum, and D.D. inserted his penis into petitioner's rectum. R. 131. Based upon 
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this conduct the State charged petitioner with two counts of sodomy upon a child, both 
first degree felonies, and one count each of dealing in harmfiil material to a minor, a third 
degree felony, and supplying alcoholic beverages to a minor, a class A misdemeanor. R. 
130-31. 
Sodomy upon a child is punishable by a minimum-mandatory term of six, ten, or 
fifteen years-to-life. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403.1 (1999). Imprisonment is mandatory. 
Id 
The Plea Agreement 
Robin K. Ljungberg of the Salt Lake Legal Defender's office represented 
petitioner. R. 136. Mr. Ljungberg negotiated a plea agreement on petitioner's behalf in 
which the State agreed to drop the two counts of sodomy upon a child and instead charge 
petitioner with one count of sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony. R. 137, 153. 
The agreement also required petitioner to plead to the third degree felony charge of 
dealing in harmfiil material to a minor, and the class A misdemeanor charge of supplying 
alcoholic beverages to a minor. Id. Petitioner accepted this agreement. Id. The State 
filed an amended information reflecting the changes. R. 163-64. 
Judge Atherton accepted petitioner's guilty plea on 6 January 1997. R. 137, 161. 
She found that petitioner's pleas were entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 
R. 150, 161. Petitioner did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
Sentencing 
On 3 March 1997 the trial court sentenced petitioner to serve one-to-fifteen years 
on count one, sexual abuse of a child, zero-to-five years on count two, dealing in harmfiil 
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material to a minor, and twelve months on count three, supply of alcohol to a minor. R. 
171-73. The sentences for counts one and two were to run consecutively to each other, 
but concurrent with the sentence for count three. Id. Petitioner did not file a notice of 
appeal. 
The Post-Conviction Petition 
On 17 April 2001 petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief.1 R. 1-14, a 
copy of the petition is contained in Addendum B. He alleged that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by: 
1) representing the interests of the State; 
2) failing to investigate and interview alibi witnesses; 
3) misleading petitioner to believe that he would be found guilty given his 
prior conviction on similar charges; 
4) misleading petitioner to believe that the examining physician's report 
contained damaging information; 
5) misleading petitioner to believe that the State would admit that its 
version of the allegations were wrong and would accept his version of 
the facts, and that the official version of the offense in the pre-sentence 
investigation report (PSI) would not be considered by the sentencing 
court, by Adult Probation and Parole in making their recommendation to 
the sentencing court, or by the Board of Pardons; 
6) refusing to allow petitioner to review the entire contents of his plea affidavit; 
and 
1
 Petitioner claims he filed his petition on 25 January 2001. Br. of Pet. at 7. 
While the docket reflects that a petition was "filed" on 25 January 2001, petitioner did not 
pay the filing fee until 17 April 2001. See Docket for case number 010900810, attached 
to right-hand side of the pleadings file. As explained below, even if the petition was 
"filed" on 25 January 2001 it was still untimely. 
4 
7) failing to correct two errors in the PSI. 
R. 8-10, Add. B. 
In response, the State argued that the claims were time barred under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-i07 (1996). R. 108-19. The State 
also argued in the alternative that petitioner waived some of his claims and that his 
remaining claims were meritless because he could not establish that, but for his counsel's 
alleged ineffectiveness, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going 
to trial. R. 119-26. 
Petitioner argued in reply that he did not learn he could file a petition for post-
conviction relief until fourteen months after his sentencing. R. 198. He also explained 
that he requested a copy of his file from his attorney on 11 May 1998, but did not receive 
it until 25 October 1999. Id. Finally, he stated that his claims were not apparent to him at 
sentencing because it was not until he received his counsel's file that he learned his 
counsel allegedly had not investigated the case. R. 198-99. 
On 11 April 2002 the court held a hearing on the petition and heard arguments 
from petitioner and counsel for the State. R. 204,217. The court dismissed the petition 
as time-barred. R. 217-20, a copy of the post-conviction court's order is contained in 
Addendum C. Petitioner timely appealed. R. 215. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Petitioner only challenges the dismissal of two of his claims: 1) that his 
counsel misadvised him regarding the applicability of the official version of the offense in 
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the PSI; and 2) that his counsel refused to allow him to review the entire contents of his 
plea affidavit. Assuming that petitioner's counsel in fact refiised to allow him to review 
the plea affidavit petitioner knew of this claim at the time of the plea hearing. Therefore, 
petitioner should have alleged this claim within the one-year limitations period governing 
petitions for post-conviction relief. Petitioner did not file his petition, however, until 
three years after the limitations period expired. Moreover, petitioner did not demonstrate 
that the "interests of justice" should excuse his late filing. Therefore, the post-conviction 
court correctly dismissed this claim as untimely. 
As originally alleged, it appeared that petitioner's claim regarding the applicability 
of the PSI's account of his crimes was also untimely because there was no dispute that 
petitioner knew of this claim at sentencing. Based on this understanding, the post-
conviction court correctly dismissed this claim as untimely. 
However, as clarified in petitioner's brief, die claim raises a factual dispute as to 
when petitioner actually discovered it Given petitioner's pro se status and his recent 
clarification of his claim, die State concedes that the Court should remand the case for 
additional factual findings regarding when this claim actually accrued. Nevertheless, the 
post-conviction court correctly dismissed petitioner's remaining claims as untimely. 
Point II. The Court should not consider petitioner's constitutional challenge 
because it is unpreserved and petitioner does not argue, let alone demonstrate that 
exceptional circumstances exist or that plain error occurred. 
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Nor could petitioner establish either exception to the preservation rule. No 
exceptional circumstances exist and any error would not have been obvious to the post-
conviction court because no court has declared unconstitutional the statute of limitations 
in Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
Moreover, nor error occurred because the limitations period in the Act is 
constitutional. Petitioner's federal constitutional challenge fails because the federal 
Suspension Clause does not restrict state legislative action. The state Suspension Clause 
is also inapplicable because the collateral relief afforded by Utah's Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act is not equivalent to the traditional writ of habeas corpus. Even assuming 
that the relief afforded in the Post-Conviction Remedies Act is equivalent to a writ of 
habeas corpus, it is well-established that time limitations or other reasonable legislative 
restrictions on habeas petitions do not violate the suspension clause. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS AS UNTIMELY; ALTHOUGH THE 
CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR ADDITIONAL FACTUAL 
FINDINGS REGARDING PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT HIS 
COUNSEL ALLEGEDLY MISADVISED HIM REGARDING 
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PSFS ACCOUNT OF HIS 
CRIMES 
Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erroneously dismissed his 
petition as untimely. Br. of Pet at 8-10. He contends that the "interests of justice" 
excused his failure to file his petition timely because he did not discover his claims until 
he received a copy of his attorney's file. Id. However, the post-conviction court correctly 
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found that all of the claims in the petition, as originally understood, were untimely and 
that the interests of justice did not excuse petitioner's late filing. R. 217-20, Add. C. 
Nevertheless, given petitioner's pro se status and the further clarification of his claim 
alleging that his counsel misadvised him about the applicability of the PSFs account of 
his crimes, the State concedes that there is a factual issue at least as to when this claim 
accrued, and that additional factual findings are necessary. 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act imposes a one-year statute of limitations. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107 (1996). Petitioners have one year from the accrual of 
their cause of action within which to file a petition. See id. If a petitioner does not appeal 
his conviction or sentence, his post-conviction claims accrue on 'the last day for filing an 
appeal from the entry of die final judgment of conviction." § 78-35a-107(2Xa). The Act 
also incorporates a ''discovery rule" for claims that could not have reasonably been 
discovered during the normal limitations period. It provides that a cause of action on 
these previously undiscoverable claims does not accrue until "the date on which petitioner 
knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts 
on which the petition is based." § 78-35a-107(2)(e). 
Although petitioner raised several claims in his petition, he challenges the 
dismissal of only two. Br. of Pet. at 8-10. He contends the post-conviction court 
erroneously dismissed his claims that: 1) his counsel misadvised him regarding the 
applicability of the official version of the offense in the PSI; and 2) his counsel refused to 
allow him to review the entire contents of his plea affidavit. Id. Because petitioner only 
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challenges the dismissal of these two claims, he has waived any challenge to the dismissal 
of the remaining claims in his petition. See Gildea v. Guardian Tide Co. of Utah, 2001 
UT 75, U 10, 31 P.3d 543 (citing the well-settled principle that issues not raised in an 
opening brief are waived and will not be considered by an appellate court). 
A. The post-conviction court correctly held that petitioner's allegation 
that his counsel refused to allow him to review the plea affidavit was 
untimely and that the "interests of justice'9 did not excuse petitioner's 
late filing. 
The post-conviction court correctly dismissed as untimely petitioner's claim 
alleging that his counsel refused to allow him to review the entire plea affidavit. 
Petitioner's sentence was entered 4 March 1997 and he did not appeal. R. 171-73. 
Therefore, the statute of limitations on his post-conviction claims began running on 3 
April 1997 (the last day he could have filed a notice of appeal) and expired one year later 
on 3 April 1998. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(2)(a) (1996). Petitioner did not 
file his petition until 17 April 2001. R. 218. Accordingly, the post-conviction court 
correctly dismissed the petition as untimely. 
Petitioner claims that the "interests of justice" should excuse his late filing because 
he did not discover this claim until he received his counsel's file on 25 October 1999.2 
2
 Petitioner's argument that his claim was undiscoverable until he received his 
attorney's file does not fit within the "interests of justice" exception. This exception does 
not operate like a "discovery rule," which tolls the statute of limitations until a claim is 
discovered. Rather, the Post-Conviction Remedies Act incorporates a "discovery rule" in 
its statute of limitations. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(2)(e). As discussed above, 
a cause of action does not accrue under the Act until "the date on which petitioner knew 
or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on 
which the petition is based." Id. Therefore, there is no need to apply the "interests of 
justice" exception to claims that allegedly could not have been discovered during the 
9 
Br. of Pet at 7, 10-11. Petitioner's argument fails. Even if petitioner did not discover his 
claim until 25 October 1999, his 17 April 2001 petition was still untimely. Moreover, 
petitioner did not need to review his counsel's file to learn of this claim. Rather, he knew 
or should have known of the facts supporting his claim at the time he entered his plea. 
Assuming petitioner did not know of his claim until he received his counsel's file 
on 25 October 1999, his petition would still be untimely. Petitioner had to file his petition 
within one year of learning the evidentiary facts supporting his claim. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-35a-107(2)(e). Petitioner admits that he learned these facts, at the latest, on 25 
October 1999. Br. of Pet. at 10-11. He therefore had until 25 October 2000 to file his 
petition. His petition was not filed, however, until 17 April 2001 when he paid the filing 
fee. R. 218, Add. C. Moreover, even if the petition was deemed "filed" on 25 January 
2001 when it was received in the clerk's office without a filing fee, it was still three 
months late. 
In any event, petitioner did not need to review his attorney's file to discover the 
factual basis of his claim. If petitioner's attorney refused to allow him to review the 
entire contents of his plea affidavit at the plea hearing, petitioner clearly knew of the facts 
supporting this claim at die time of his plea hearing. Consequently, petitioner could have 
asserted this claim within die original one year limitations period 
normal limitations period. To do so would render subsection (2)(e) mere surplusage. "In 
analyzing a statute's plain language/' however, Utah courts "must attempt to give each 
part of the provision a relevant and independent meaning so as to give effect to all of its 
terms:' State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, J 34, 53 P.2d 1210. 
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Petitioner offers no other reason in his brief why the "interests of justice" should 
have excused his late filing. He argued below that his ignorance of the opportunity to 
seek post-conviction relief and his ignorance of the statute of limitations satisfied the 
"interests of justice" exception. R. 219, Add. C. The post-conviction court correctly 
rejected these claims, however. See, e.g., Godinski v. United States, 304 F.3d 761, 762 
(7th Cir. 2002) ("Ignorance of the law does not justify an extension of the one-year 
limitations period to commence a collateral attack"); People v. Vigil, 955 P.2d 589, 591-
92 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) ("[Defendant's indigence, ignorance of the law, and lack of 
legal assistance" did not excuse the late filing of a collateral challenge to his conviction). 
Accordingly, the post-conviction court correctly dismissed as untimely petitioner's claim 
that his counsel refused to allow him to review his plea affidavit. 
B. As originally pled, the post-conviction court also correctly dismissed 
as untimely petitioner's claim that his counsel misadvised him 
regarding the applicability of the PSI's account of his crimes; 
nevertheless, given petitioner's additional clarification the State agrees 
that this claim should be remanded for additional factual findings. 
As originally pled, it appeared that petitioner was, or should have been aware at 
sentencing of the facts supporting his claim that his counsel misadvised him regarding the 
applicability of die PSFs account of his crimes. Petitioner originally pled in his pro se 
petition that his counsel mislead him to believe that the State would admit that its version 
of the allegations were wrong and would accept his version of the facts, and that the 
official version of the offense in the PSI would not be considered by the sentencing court, 
by Adult Probation and Parole in making their recommendation to the sentencing court, 
11 
or by the Board of Pardons. R. 9, Add. B. Petitioner admitted, however, that he had read 
through the PSI with his counsel prior to sentencing. R. 218, Add. C. Therefore, at 
sentencing he would have been aware that the official version of the offense had some 
weight with AP&P and with the sentencing court. As originally pled, it appeared that 
petitioner knew of this claim at sentencing but failed to raise it timely. 
Petitioner now clarifies in his brief that he only recently learned that the Board of 
Pardons relies on the PSFs version of the offense, although his counsel had allegedly told 
him otherwise. Br. of Pet at 9-10. This allegation was not clear from petitioner's 
original petition, which heaped this claim together with other claims regarding the 
sentencing court and AP&P. R. 9, Add- B. Nor did petitioner sufficiently clarify this 
claim at the hearing on his petition.3 Indeed, in accordance with the State's original 
interpretation of petitioner's claim, die post-conviction court found that petitioner knew 
or should have known of the evidentiary facts supporting each of his claims at the time he 
was sentenced. R. 218, Add. C. 
Nevertheless, in hindsight, and with the additional clarification in petitioner's 
brief, the State concedes that petitioner's pro se petition could be liberally construed to 
allege that he had not, and could not have discovered this claim at sentencing. The State 
concedes that as clarified in his brief, petitioner's allegation creates a factual issue as to 
when this claim accrued. Therefore, given petitioner's additional clarification, and his 
pro se status, the State concedes that this Court should remand the case for additional 
3
 Petitioner did not include a transcript of the hearing in the record on appeal. 
Rather, he certified that the transcript was not necessary. R. 224. 
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factual findings as to when this claim accrued. If additional facts reveal that this claim is 
untimely, the post-conviction court may dismiss the claim. If the claim is timely, 
however, the post-conviction court can then consider its merits.4 
II. THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER 
PETITIONER'S UNPRESERVED CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGE; IN ANY EVENT THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS ON POST-CONVICTION PETITIONS IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
For the first time on appeal petitioner argues that the statute of limitations in the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act is unconstitutional. Br. of Pet. at 11-14. This Court 
should decline to consider this unpreserved claim, however, because petitioner does not 
argue that any exception to the preservation rule applies. Alternatively, petitioner has not 
and cannot demonstrate that the statute of limitations is plainly unconstitutional. 
A. The Court should decline to review petitioner's unpreserved claim 
because he does not argue that any exception to the preservation 
rule applies. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citing State v. Marvin, 964 
P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998)). "[T]he preservation rule applies to every claim, including 
constitutional questions." Id (citing Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 
1996)). Petitioner did not raise this claim below; therefore, it is unpreserved. See id. 
Petitioner can raise an unpreserved issue on appeal if he demonstrates that plain 
error occurred or that exceptional circumstances exist. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 11 
4
 The State does not concede, however, that petitioner would be able to establish 
that his claim was timely or meritorious. 
f3 
(citing Monson, 928 P.2d at 1022). Petitioner fails to argue, let alone demonstrate, that 
either exception to the preservation rule applies. Consequently, this Court should decline 
to review petitioner's unpreserved claim. See State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, f 71,455 
Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (declining to review an unpreserved claim where the party failed to 
argue plain error or exceptional circumstances); State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9, f 33,44 
P.3d 609 (same); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (same). 
B. Petitioner cannot demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist 
or that plain error occurred. 
Even if this Court were to review petitioner's claim under the plain error or 
exceptional circumstances exceptions the claim would nevertheless fail. Exceptional 
circumstances arise only when "rare procedural anomalies" occur. See Holgate, 2000 UT 
74 at f 12. There were no such "procedural anomalies" in the proceedings below. 
Nor could petitioner demonstrate that plain error occurred. To do so he would 
have to show: "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 
1993). Even assuming that the post-conviction court erred, petitioner could not 
demonstrate that the error "should have been obvious." See id. An error is not obvious 
where there is no settled law on the issue. See State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 
1992) (relying on the "clarity of the law in this area" to find that the error should have 
been obvious); State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, \ 12, 53 P.3d 486 ('"To show 
obviousness of the error [Defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of 
trial/") (quoting State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, U 6, 18 P.3d 1123) (alteration in 
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original). As this Court observed in Swart v. State, 1999 UT App 96, f 4, 976 P.2d 100, 
"no court has yet actually declared the statute of limitations set forth in section 78-3 5a-
107 unconstitutional." Furthermore, unlike the post-conviction court in Swart, the post-
conviction court here considered the "interests of justice" exception, but found that 
petitioner had not carried his burden to demonstrate why the exception should apply. R. 
217-20, Add. C. Consequently, petitioner's plain error claim would fail becatise any error 
could not have been obvious to the post-conviction court. 
In any event, the post-conviction court did not err because the statute of limitations 
is constitutional. Petitioner claims the statute of limitations violates the Suspension 
Clause of both the federal and state constitutions. Br. of Pet. at 11-14. His claim fails for 
three reasons: 1) the federal Suspension Clause is inapplicable because it restricts only 
federal congressional action, not that of state legislatures; 2) the state Suspension Clause 
is also inapplicable because an action under Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act is not 
equivalent to a petition for writ of habeas corpus; and 3) even if the writ of habeas corpus 
has expanded to include collateral post-conviction relief, reasonable legislative 
restrictions on the availability of that relief do no amount to an unconstitutional 
"suspension" of the writ of habeas corpus. 
The federal Suspension Clause is inapplicable because it restricts only federal 
congressional action. It is found in Article I of the United States Constitution, which 
creates and enumerates the powers of the federal congress. U.S. CONST, art. 1, § 9. It 
places no restrictions on the power of state legislatures to "suspend" the privilege of the 
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state writ of habeas corpus. See id. Indeed, even as early as 1917 the Unites States 
Supreme Court recognized that "Section 9 of Article 1, as has long been settled, is not 
restrictive of state, but only of national, action." Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U.S. 367, 369 
(1917). See also, Flannigan v. State, 3 P.3d 372, 374 (Alaska 2000) (holding that the 
federal Suspension Clause does not limit state regulation of habeas corpus). 
The state Suspension Clause is equally inapplicable because a petition under 
Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act is not equivalent to a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. "The writ of habeas corpus known to the Framers was quit different from that 
which exists today." Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663 (1996). Historically, a writ of 
habeas corpus could not be used to challenge the constitutionality of a conviction. For 
example, in Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193,202-Q3 (1830), the United States Supreme 
Court held that a federal court's evaluation of a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus was 
limited to determining whether die court: of conviction had subject matter jurisdiction. "A 
judgment, in its nature concludes the subject on which it is rendered, and pronounces the 
law of the case. The judgment of a court of record whose jurisdiction is final, is as 
conclusive on all the world as the judgment of this Court would be It puts an end to 
inquiry concerning the fact, by deciding it." Id. After reviewing the English common 
law which informed its understanding of the scope of the writ, the Court explained that 
"[t]he judgment of the circuit court in a criminal case is of itself evidence of its own 
legality," and the Court could not "usurp that power by the instrumentality of the writ of 
habeas corpus." Id. at 207. As one commentator explained, "[t]he writ was simply not 
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available at all to one convicted of a crime by a court of competent jurisdiction." Paul M. 
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 
Harv. L. Rev. 441, 446 (1963). 
In contrast, Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act expands upon the narrow 
avenue of relief provided by the traditional writ of habeas corpus. Utah's Act allows a 
defendant to collaterally challenge the constitutionality of his conviction or sentence and 
to raise claims based on newly discovered evidence. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 5a-
104(1) (1996). Therefore, a petition under Utah's Act is more akin to the common law 
writ of error coram nobis not habeas corpus.5 See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 
1981) ("The postconviction hearing procedure is a successor to the common-law writ of 
error coram nobis"). Consequently, the Suspension Clause in the Utah Constitution is 
inapplicable because it only restricts the legislature's ability to suspend the "privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus." UTAH CONST, art. I, § 5. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the scope of the federal writ 
of habeas corpus now includes post-conviction collateral review similar to that permitted 
by Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See, e.g., Felker, 518 U.S. at 663. For 
example, in Felker, the Court briefly surveyed the history of habeas review and 
recognized that its own decisions eventually interpreted the federal statute authorizing 
habeas review "to allow a final judgment of conviction in a state court to be collaterally 
5
 A writ of error coram nobis 6Svas used by a sentencing court to modify or vacate 
a judgment of conviction on the basis of facts which, without defendant's fault, did not 
appear on the face of the record and as to which defendant was without other remedy." 
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981). 
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attacked on habeas." Id. Even if a petition under Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies \ct 
were equivalent to a petition for writ of habeas corpus, however, the statute of limitations 
would not violate the Suspension Clause of the Utah Constitution. 
Utah's Suspension Clause provides: "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires 
it." UTAH CONST, art. I, § 5. This clause "is essentially identical" to the federal 
Suspension Clause. Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989). See also Currier v. 
Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1365 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Hurst and noting that art. I, § 5 
"essentially parallels" its federal counterpart). Therefore, Utah courts may look to federal 
precedents for guidance in interpreting Utah's Suspension Clause. See Sandy City v. 
Larson, 733 P.2d 137, 138 (Utah 1987) (holding that U.S. Supreme Court cases 
interpreting federal self-incrimination provision provide guidance in interpreting its Utah 
counter-part). Federal precedents make it absolutely clear that statutes of limitation, or 
other reasonable statutory restrictions on the availability of the writ do not amount to an 
unconstitutional "suspension" of die writ of habeas corpus. 
It is well-settled that die legislature may restrict the scope of the writ of habeas 
corpus. As die United States Supreme Court stated in Felker, i4we have long recognized 
that 4the power to award die writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given 
by written law."' 518 U.S. at 664 (quoting Ex Parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 94, 2 L. Ed. 
554 (1807)). Likewise the Court has "recognized that judgments about die proper scope 
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of the writ are 'normally for Congress to make.'" Id. (quoting Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 
U.S. 314, 323 (1996)). 
Because Congress is responsible to determine the proper scope of the writ, federal 
courts have unanimously upheld the federal statute of limitations on the filing of a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Like the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act, the act 
governing federal habeas relief for state prisoners includes a one-year limitations period. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Numerous federal courts have addressed the issue of 
whether this limitations period amounts to an unconstitutional "suspension" of the writ of 
habeas corpus. "Every court which has addressed the issue - i.e., whether, as a general 
matter, § 2244(d) constitutes an unconstitutional suspension of the writ - has concluded 
that it does not" Wyzykowski v. Dept. of Corrections, 226 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 
2000); see also, Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 891 
(1998). As the United States Supreme Court recently held, the vehicles available to a 
defendant for challenging die constitutionality of his conviction "are not available 
indefinitely and without limitation." Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 381 (2001). 
Rather, the Court observed that i4[p]rocedural barriers, such as statutes of limitations and 
rules concerning procedural default and exhaustion of remedies, operate to limit access to 
review on the merits of a constitutional claim." Id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725, 731 (1993)). 
Likewise, state courts have held that although a writ of habeas corpus may not be 
suspended or abrogated by legislative action, a legislature may regulate the procedure 
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with respect to habeas corpus. See Jordan v. Housewright, 696 P.2d 998 (Nev. 1985), 
Maryland House of Correction v. Fields, 703 A.2d 167 (Md. 1997); Ex parte Davis, 947 
S.W. 2d 216 (Tex. Crim App. 1996). Thus, even if Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
is viewed as an extension of rights under the common law writ of habeas corpus, the 
legislature may enact a statute of limitations governing relief under the Act. See Felker, 
518 U.S. at 664; Daniels, 532 U.S. at 381. Accordingly, like its federal counterpart, the 
statute of limitations in Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act is not an unconstitutional 
"suspension" of the writ of habeas corpus. 
CONCLUSION 
The statute of limitations governing post-conviction petitions is constitutional and 
the post-conviction court correctly dismissed the petition as untimely, with die exception 
of petitioner's claim alleging that his attorney misinformed him about die applicability of 
the PSF account of his crimes. Given the clarification in petitioner's brief, the State 
agrees that this claim should be remanded for additional factual findings regarding when 
it actually accrued. The Court should affirm, however, the dismissal of petitioner's 
remaining claims. 
Respectfully submitted this ^f" day of November 2002. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Addendum A 
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases 
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. 
U.S. CONST, art I, § 9. 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of 
rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it. 
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 5. 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the 
cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following 
dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the 
case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court 
or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the 
decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is 
filed; or 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based. 
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's 
failure to file within the time limitations. 
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period established in 
this section. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107 (1996). 
Addendum B 
Addendum R 
SJakt- \Z>o<lr A (naste) 
Attorney Pro Se 
•?.rt &«^2.gtf faddress^ 
tw»*r; UT faddress^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY 
Utlt J. Sfti^ petitioner, 
vs. 
f|«nW Cf^* Respondent. 
» FETITICN FOR RELIEF UNDER 
* THE FCST-CONVICTION REMEDI: 
« ACT 
» UCA §78-2£a-lCl.e- sec. 
* URCF Rule 6zC 
* Case No. 
* 
* Judce 
I. NAME OF RESPONDENT: 
X. Conviction of Felonv: State of Utah 
y'Conviction cf Misdemeanor: County of: 4 * ^ Uc>-C 
Conviction of Misdemeanor: Municipality cf: ^ *A^l^«, 
II. IDENTIFICATION OF CURRENT AND RELATED CASES 
1(a), Name of court that entered the judgment being 
challenged: TK+t Jg^i ^ Jwlg coorV 
(b). Location cf Court: HSo *.. *4»U *. Sue 
(c). Case number:_2felfl^LL3fa 
Date of judgment being challenged: A \ P ^ K M iq^7 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
5. What was your plea? 
Not guilty 
y Guilty 
No contest 
Guilty and Mentally ill 
Not guilty by reason of insanity 
6. If you entered a plea of guilty to sone counts, and a not 
a to ether counts, give your plea to each count: guilty pie 
7. If you pled not guilty or net guilty by reason of 
insanity, was 'the trial before? 
Jury Judge 
8. Did you testify at the trial? 
Yes Y No 
5. Did ycu appeal front the conviction or sentence? 
Yes X No 
10. If your answer is "yes" provide the following 
information: 
A. Name of Appellate Court:. 
Case Number:_„ 
Result: 
Effective 1/96 
a 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Date of result or citation of opinion:. 
Grounds raised: 
Cid ycu seek further review cf this appeal? 
Yes Nc 
If ycur answer i s ,!yes,f crevice the fcilcwinc 
information: 
(1) Name cf Reviewing Ccurt:. 
(2) Case number: 
(2; Result: 
(4; Date cf result or citation of cpinicn:. 
(5) Grounds raised: 
11. If you did not appeal from your conviction or sentence, 
why not? I L L U ^ AWi'x QHIAXV W ^ IT \*. so d^ ** ^^A 
12(a). Other than your direct appeal from your conviction or 
sentence, have you filed any petitions, applications, or motions 
with respect to this conviction or sentence in any court, state or 
federal? 
Effective 7/96 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
^Yes A No 
(b). If your answer is "yes", provide the following 
information: 
(1) Name of court:. 
(2) Case Number: 
(3; Result:. 
(4) Date cf result citation of opinion: 
(5) Grounds Raised: 
(c) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing en ycur petition, 
application, or mcrion? 
Yes No 
(d) Did you appeal the decision en ycur petition, application 
or motion? 
Yes No 
(e) If your answer is "yes,11 provide the following 
information: 
(1) Name of court: 
(2) Case Number: 
(3) Result:, 
(4) Date of result citation of opinion: 
(5) Grounds Raised: 
Effective 7/96 
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PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
13(a). Other than the case described in question 12, have 
you filed any further petitions, applications, or notions with 
respect to this conviction or sentence in any court, state or 
federal? 
Yes _ £ _ No 
(b) If your answer is "yes," provide the following 
information: 
(1) Name cf court:. 
(2) Case Number: 
(I) Result: 
(4) Date cf result citation cr cpinicn:. 
(5) Grounds Raised: 
(c) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing en ycur petition, 
application, or metier*? 
Yes No 
(d) Did you appeal the decision en ycur petition, application 
or motion? 
Yes No 
(e) If your answer is "yes," provide the following 
information: 
(1) Name cf court: 
(2) Case Number:_ 
(3; Result:. 
(4) Date cf result citation of opinion:. 
(5) Grounds Raised: 
Effective 7/96 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
14(a) Do you have any petition, appeal, cr motion now pending 
in any court, "state or federal, relating tc the judgnent being 
challenged: 
y Yes No 
(b) If your answer i s "yes," provide the following 
information: 
(1) Name cf caur t : 3 r* J*i,c>* ^ U ^ V to*r\r 
(2) Case timber: *L\lo\*6\f± \ 
(3) Nature cf proceeding: ,n«*»^  W fafrttN^ »fr s^^irC 
III. Grounds Fcr Relief 
NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER: You may be barred frcm presenting 
additional grounds in a future post-conviction petition if you fail 
to present any grounds that you could present here but do net. 
The following is a list cf the most frequently raised grounds 
for relief in Post-Conviction proceedings. Each statement preceded 
by a letter constitutes a separate ground for possible relief. You 
should raise in this petition any of these grounds that apply and 
any other grounds net*listed that you may have available. 
DO NOT MERELY CHECK THE GROUNDS LISTED. If you believe any of 
these grounds apply to you. You must allege facts. The petition 
will be returned" to you" if you merely check a ground and fail to 
list necessary facts"or attach supporting documentation. 
(a) Conviction obtained by plea of guilty that was unlawfully 
induced or net made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of 
the charge and the consequences of the plea. 
(b) Conviction obtained by use cf coerced confession. 
6 Effective 7/96 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
(c) Convicticn obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to 
an unconstitutional search and seizure. 
(d) Conviction obtained by use of evidence obtained pursuant 
to an unlawful arrest. 
(e) Conviction obtained by a violation of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
(f) Conviction obtained by the unconstitutional failure of 
the prosecution tc disclcse to the defendant evidence favorable to 
che defendant. 
(c) Convicticn obtained by a viclaticr. cf the prelection 
against double jeopardy. 
(h) Conviction obtained by action of a grand cr petit jury 
that was unconstitutionally selected and impaneled. 
(i) Denial cf effective assistance of counsel. 
(j) Convicticn under an unconstitutional statute or 
constitutionally protected conduct. 
(k) Denial of right tc appeal. 
State concisely every ground on which you claim you are 
entitled to post-conviction relief. Summarize* briefly the facts 
supporting each ground. If necessary, you may attach* additional 
pages stating additional grounds and facts supporting same. 
(a) GROUND ONE: 1W.I of effo^u, ***:*X+«,.* *£ t*u«.<>*[ 
Supporting Facts fcr Ground One (state briefly without citing 
law or making argument): 
/^^VfcvJrv <A 
7 Effect ive 7/96 
i *~) ^?/ouv\<A Q\r\e^ 
1 V ^ ^ £>4 g f i f c c - k W *<£. ^ * c ^ ( . > • - -
r 
- 4 v a ^ (tru *t*n/**,>) • ik. 5 \ ^ ^ ^ ^/wv^- 4^^, ;oe.fc*- wg^ Ciavs^ <^ \Po J ^ 
_^_ 
.^rr c v^ v^  
6, \ vJo r. 
T), fcA>; rr \ Qx 2 -Wdc^y< . ^ > y ^ ^ c d v - ."></^ 
C (7 
fi ' W A , 4_ai ^ * * f t y 3 ^ &±4 <«sc C M * . (;J,«o> / t ^ « ^ * W A y 4 W w < _ LS >"0 - A - jr 
;«n<^ Ca^l fe s^ Vg V*. 
( 
\^J4i^SfcL X i^oOA V \ i » u ^ U^fJC - T ^ ^ A ^ ' < ^ ^ ^ O ^ s ^ W ^ . i 
(V- ' u3> yO^\A &* ' A / ^ C 
'-g:^ a '
 a-V * ^ £ g c A ^ £ ^ s * , ^ •**«*€£. ^ (oJ^ tv 
^
J w
^
e \ ^ ^ g y ^ ^ r A A W t , /w>ftv^f^—fflz / J / ^ ^ W ^ A^n^/A^Cv- >^N 
/a 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
(h) GROUND TWO; OfAj/aI ofeffkc/>>g /iSf.'sr+„ee of COCUJ 
Supporting Facts for Ground Two ( s t a t s b r i e f i y without c i t i n g 
law or makina arcucent): 
(^At^^tS\ 
( c ) GROUND THRK-: I ai^J^\\ 
Supporting Facts for Ground Three (state briefly without 
citing law or making argument): 
Effective 7/96 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
(c) GROUND FOUR: 
Supporting Facts for Ground Four (state briefly wirhour citing 
law or making argument): 
16. If any cf the grounds lisred above were ncr previously 
presented in any orher courr, srare or federal, srate briefly which 
crounds were not uresented and your reasons for nor presenting 
then. " 
17. Give the name and address, if known, of each attorney who 
presented ycu in the following stages of the judgment being 
challenged: 
(a) Preliminary hearing: *kku fa^V^ £JH-«ACLJA/ A 
(b) Arraignment and Plea: ^ " "J HW* $*>*> tfn 
(c) T r i a l : JL(& 5 ^ "r cruu> 
(d) Sentencing: u *^,M 
(e) Aooeal: 
Effective 7/96 
/S 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
(f)~ Post-conviction proceeding: 
(g) Appeal from post-conviction proceeding:. 
18(a) Do you have any future sentence to serve after you 
complete the sentence imposed by the judgment being challenged? 
Yes >/ No 
(b) If your answer is "yes,11 give the following 
information: 
(1) Name cf Court: 
(2) Location:. 
(2) Case Number:, 
IV. REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS 
NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER: If you do not attach the required 
copies or provide an explanation cf why you cannot provide them. 
This petition will not be filed and will be returned to you. You 
may then lose your right to file a petition if the statute cf 
limitations expires before you file another petiticn. 
19. Attach a copy of the following documents to this petition 
or provide an explanation why you cannot provide the copies. 
(a) The judgment and commitment being challenged. 
(b) Any decision issued by an appellate court from the direct 
appeal. 
(c) Any previously-filed petition for post-conviction relief, 
and any decision issued* as a result. 
(d) Affidavits, records, or other documentary evidence that 
support your claim. 
(e) An affidavit of impecunicsity and certificate from the 
Inmate Accounting Office, if you are requesting waiver of the 
filing fee. 
(f) Memorandum of Points and Authorities^ 
V. PETITIONER'S VERIFICATION UNDER OATH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
10 Effective 7/96 
PETITION FOR POST 
-CONVICTION RELIS* 
:ss 
COUNTY OF h\s(/ ) 
I the undersigned petitioner, declare under penalty cf perjury 
that the information I have provided in this petition is true and 
correct. 
Sicr.atura^ jof Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED X5D SWRtf to before r.e en this Z3> cay cf 
N6TAR¥rtltUC 
JANENE H. HUANO 
MyCOIfWIlMlQftcXplNS 
STATE OF UTAH 1 
VI. CERTIFICATION CF ATTORNEY (If petitioner is represented 
by attorney)• 
I certify I am the attorney for petitioner, and tha- zhis petition 
copies with Rule 11 (UT:ah "Rules of Civil Procedure). 
Signature of Attorney 
Name of petitioner: 
Address 
f-ective //' Efis 
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Addendum C 
Addendum C 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD (8497) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DALE J. BAIRD, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
HANKGALETKA, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Case No. 010900810 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
This matter came before the Court 11 April 2002 for a hearing on petitioner's petition for 
post-conviction relief. Petitioner was present and appeared pro se; Respondent appeared through 
counsel, Assistant Attorney General Christopher D. Ballard. The Court has reviewed the 
petition, the State's response, and petitioner's reply. The Court also heard argument on the 
petition at the hearing. Now being folly advised in the premises, the Court enters the following 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order dismissing the petition with prejudice: 
NLEDDlS7^AT^ri8nT 
Third JUJCW uistnct 
JUM - 3 * * + 
Deputy Clerk 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On 6 January 1997 petitioner pled guilty to one count each of sexual abuse of a child, 
a second degree felony, dealing in harmful material to a minor, a third degree felony, and supply 
of alcohol to a minor, a class A misdemeanor. 
2. Petitioner was sentenced on 3 March 1997. 
3. Petitioner did not appeal his criminal conviction or sentence. The last day he could 
have filed a notice of appeal was 2 April 1997. 
4. Petitioner filed his post-conviction petition on 17 April 2001. 
5. Although petitioner claims that he did not realize the full extent of his counsel's 
alleged ineffectiveness until he received a copy of his counsel's file, petitioner knew, or should 
have known of the evidentiary facts supporting each of his claims at the time petitioner was 
sentenced. 
6. Petitioner did not even request that his attorney provide him with information from his 
file until 11 May 1998. 
7. At the hearing on his petition petitioner admitted that he reviewed the pre-sentence 
investigation report with his counsel prior to sentencing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner's cause of action accrued on 2 April 1997—the last day he could have filed 
a notice of appeal—and expired one year later on 2 April 1998. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-
107(2). 
2 
2. Because petitioner did not file his petition until 17 April 2001, the petition is untimely. 
See id. 
3. Interpretation of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act as a whole demonstrates that the 
"interests of justice" exception to the statute of limitations was meant to apply under only truly 
exceptional circumstances. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35al07(3). 
4. Petitioner's ignorance of the opportunity to seek post-conviction relief does not excuse 
his failure to file his petition timely, nor do the interests of justice excuse the untimeliness of his 
petition on this ground. 
5. Petitioner's ignorance of the statute of limitations likewise does not excuse his failure 
to file his petitioner timely, nor do the interests of justice excuse the untimeliness of his petition 
on this ground. 
6. Petitioner has not alleged or demonstrated any additional reason that the interests of 
justice should excuse his failure to file his petition timely. 
7. Therefore, the interests of justice do not excuse petitioner's failure to file within the 
time limitations* 
8. Petitioner is entitled to appeal this order. If he wishes to do so, he must file a timely 
notice of appeal. Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that "the notice of 
appeal... shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of 
the judgment or order appealed from. Utah R. App. P. 4. 
3 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
The petition for post-convictianyelief is DISMISSED with prejudice. 
DATED this ^ day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Dale J. Baird 
ProSe 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on 22 April 2002,, I mailed, postage prepaid a correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER DISMISSING 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF to: 
Dale J. Baird, #26105 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
^st^sC&CJ7 
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